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Abstract—The text search queries in an enterprise can reveal
the users’ topic of interest, and in turn conﬁdential staff or busi-
ness information. To safeguard the enterprise from consequences
arising from a disclosure of the query traces, it is desirable to
obfuscate the true user intention from the search engine, without
requiring it to be re-engineered. In this paper, we advocate a
unique approach to proﬁle the topics that are relevant to the
user intention. Based on this approach, we introduce an (1, 2)-
privacy model that allows a user to stipulate that topics relevant
to her intention at 1 level should appear to any adversary to be
innocuous at 2 level. We then present a TopPriv algorithm to
achieve the customized (1, 2)-privacy requirement of individual
users through injecting automatically formulated fake queries.
The advantages of TopPriv over existing techniques are conﬁrmed
through benchmark queries on a real corpus, with experiment
settings fashioned after an enterprise search application.
I. INTRODUCTION
Text search is increasingly incorporated in enterprise content
management. While a text search engine enables users in
an enterprise to retrieve unstructured data intuitively and
effectively, the queries issued by the users can potentially
compromise their privacy [1]. This is obvious with queries that
contain personal identiﬁcation information, like social security
number and telephone number. Even in the absence of such
speciﬁc information, the topic(s) of the queries could still lead
to an undesirable disclosure.
To elaborate on the risk, suppose that a software developer is
doing a clean-room implementation of an image compression
standard. Coincidentally, an employee on another team who
is interested in image compression is researching the topic
on an external text database and, in the process, inadvertently
retrieves information on a competitor’s code library. Should a
copyright dispute arise over the implementation subsequently,
the search history on the external database could present an in-
criminating evidence against the software developer. To avoid
this complication, the software developer and the employee
would want to avoid revealing, or at least to plausibly deny,
that they are responsible for the search on that topic.
For a different example, we consider a commercial real
estate rental company which provides, in addition to physical
facilities, searchable electronic databases to its tenants. The
rental company would be keen to ensure that it has no way
of identifying reliably the topics that the tenants search on,
so that it can disclaim any knowledge should a tenant utilize
chemical recipes retrieved from the databases to manufacture
illicit drugs.
The two examples above highlight the primary motivations
for privacy protection in enterprise text search: On one hand,
end-users have a preference, perhaps even the right, to keep
their searches private. On the other hand, the enterprise that
provides the search infrastructure is keen to offer this privacy
protection, in order to avoid any liability arising from the
users’ searches. Furthermore, the subject of privacy protec-
tion extends beyond personal identiﬁcation information and
speciﬁc keywords in the queries, to the users’ topics or areas
of interest.
User and data privacy have been studied extensively. How-
ever, existing solutions neither eliminate nor satisfy the topical
privacy protection that we advocate. In particular, anonym-
ization schemes like Tor [2] are not applicable when access
to the database requires a subscription or user authentication.
Cryptographic protocols for testing whether an encrypted
document contains a given encrypted query term (e.g., [3],
[4], [5] and [6]) can be extended to retrieve documents that
exactly satisfy a Boolean expression of query terms. However,
they are not applicable to modern text search engines designed
to ﬁnd documents that are most similar to a given query.
Similarity retrieval based on the vector space model [7] is
more effective than the Boolean model; this is particularly so
in situations where users ﬁnd it difﬁcult to formulate precise
queries because they have only a vague description of the
target documents. To identify documents that are similar to a
query, search engines typically maintain an inverted list of the
documents containing each term. Conceptually, a user could
retrieve the inverted lists needed for her query from a PIR
(Private Information Retrieval) [8] server. While this approach
makes queries indistinguishable to any adversary, it is not
practical because the search engine has to be redesigned to
push the similarity computation to the users, and because PIR
retrievals have very high overheads.
Instead of aiming for query indistinguishability, the private
2012 IEEE 28th International Conference on Data Engineering
1 
text search techniques in [9] and [10] leave the corpus in
plaintext on the server, and issue ghost queries to obfuscate
(a weaker security notion) the user queries, also in plaintext.
The challenge with the TrackMeNot mechanism of [9] is in
generating ghost queries that resemble real queries, which
often contain semantically rich or related terms. As for [10],
the key constraint is that each query at runtime has to be
mapped to the most similar one among a set of pre-conﬁgured
queries. [11] proposes to embellish each user query with decoy
terms. In order not to degrade the quality of the query result,
the search engine has to be modiﬁed to derive the encrypted
relevance scores from only the genuine search terms.
In this study, we adopt the obfuscation approach of [9]
and [10], because it is purely client-based and necessitates
no changes to existing text search engines. We observe that
a randomly generated ghost query may not mask the user’s
topic of interest. To illustrate, consider a user query “AH-64
Apache helicopter” that is submitted with the ghost query “M-
1 Abrams tank”. Without telling the user query from the ghost
query, an adversary can conclude that the topic of interest
is U.S. weaponry. In comparison, the ghost query “SQ-333
Changi airport” points to a different topic – civil aviation – and
forces the adversary to guess which of the two queries/topics
is genuine.
Contributions: The focus of this work is on protecting
similarity text search queries in enterprise applications, with-
out changing the search engines. We go beyond masking
the keywords in user queries, to obfuscating the underlying
topic(s) of interest. This entails two challenges – determining
a user’s topic of interest, then generating ghost queries on
alternate topics. Our unique topical approach embodies three
key contributions over the existing work.
First, we advocate a new privacy framework for text search,
built on topic disclosure. We postulate that the prior belief in
the relevance of various topics reﬂects the general interest
of all users, and is determined by the topic coverage of
the corpus. For example, searchers of the ACM portal have
a general interest in computing topics. Given a query, its
keyword composition leads to a revision in belief in the various
topics. Those topics with a signiﬁcant gain in posterior belief
over prior belief are genuine, and constitute the speciﬁc user
intention behind the query.
To protect the user intention, we introduce a (1, 2)-privacy
model. The model stipulates that, before a query is submitted
to the search engine, those topics with more than 1 gain in
posterior belief over prior belief are genuine and should be
suppressed by accompanying ghost queries to some level 2 ≤
1. This makes the user intention innocuous, as the genuine
topics appear to the adversary to be below the threshold 1
where topics are judged to be relevant. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst formal privacy model for text search
based on topical belief.
The third contribution is TopPriv, a TOPical PRIVacy
solution for suppressing the user intention behind a text
search query according to the (1, 2)-privacy model. TopPriv
identiﬁes topics that are unrelated to the user intention, then
forms ghost queries from decoy terms pertaining to those
unrelated topics, and ﬁnally conﬁrms that the genuine topics
of interest are no longer apparent in the mix of user query and
ghost queries. TopPriv also solves the problem of generating
realistic ghost queries, by composing them from semantically
coherent terms. The feasibility of TopPriv is demonstrated
through experiments conducted with a typical enterprise setup,
involving standard TREC queries [12] on a large collection of
Wall Street Journal articles.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II surveys related work. In Section III, we set out the
system context of our enterprise search engine, then outline
the threats that concern us as well as related threats that are
beyond the scope of our study. Section IV presents our Top-
Priv framework; after deﬁning the (1, 2)-privacy model, we
introduce our techniques to model the user intention, followed
by our algorithm for generating realistic ghost queries. We also
discuss why TopPriv is resilient against attempts to circumvent
it, and why it is more appropriate for text search than existing
privacy models. We evaluate TopPriv empirically in Section V.
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we brieﬂy survey the literature on privacy
in text retrieval, as well as on data privacy.
Privacy in Text Retrieval
TrackMeNot [9], a browser extension, protects user queries
from public search engines by hiding a user’s genuine search
queries among randomly generated ‘ghost’ queries. The chal-
lenge in implementing the method, as the authors pointed out,
is that the ghost queries often can be ruled out easily because
their term combinations are not meaningful.
[13] suggested that user privacy may be protected by push-
ing the search index and query processing to a trusted third
party, or by legally compelling the search engine to “forget”
the user activities right after they are served. However, the risk
of privacy disclosure when the trusted third party or search
engine is inﬁltrated remains.
In [14], Jiang et al suggested that to safeguard a query, it is
presented to the server as a vector of encrypted term weights.
The server then combines the query vector with the document
vectors in turn to produce a list of encrypted scores for the
user. As this procedure has to be carried out on every document
on the server, it is too expensive for search engines that need
to support large corpora. To achieve scalability, search engines
must be able to ﬁnd the most relevant documents to a query
by examining just a small subset of the corpora.
In [10], Murugesan and Clifton proposed to construct static
groups of canonical queries, such that the queries in each
group cover diverse topics. At runtime, a user query is substi-
tuted by the closest canonical query, while the other queries
in the same group serve as cover queries to mask the user
intent. The query groups are constructed by (a) mapping the
dictionary terms into a 30-factor space with latent semantic
indexing (LSI); (b) forming canonical queries from terms that
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are in close proximity of each other in the factor space using a
kd-tree nearest neighbor retrieval; and (c) selecting canonical
queries with similar popularity from different parts of the fac-
tor space. One concern is that substituting the user query with
a canonical query affects the precision-recall characteristics
intended by the search engine designer, as demonstrated in
[10].
[15] proposes to project the documents and user queries
from the original term space into a synthetic factor space
formed with LSI. As query processing involves similarity
matching in the factor space, the server is oblivious of the
actual term composition of the queries and result documents.
However, LSI is known to perform well only for small homo-
geneous corpora [16], and is not suitable for large document
collections that span multiple subject domains. Hence there is
still a need for a privacy-preserving scheme that works with
conventional similarity retrieval in the original term space.
Recently, [11] introduced the technique of query embel-
lishment. The idea is to inject each user query with decoy
terms pointing to plausible alternative topics in order to mask
the user intention. The decoy terms are selected to match the
genuine search terms in speciﬁcity and semantic association,
using information extracted automatically from a thesaurus. To
ensure usability, a retrieval protocol is provided that enables
the search engine to compute encrypted document relevance
scores with respect to only the genuine search terms, while
remaining oblivious to their differentiation from the decoys.
The main drawback is that it requires changes to the search
engine.
Private Information Retrieval
To identify documents that are similar to a query, search
engines typically maintain an inverted list for each term
wi. The list includes a pair 〈pij , dj〉 for each document dj
containing wi, such that pij quantiﬁes wi’s impact in dj . The
result of a query can be composed from the inverted lists of the
search terms, thus skipping the documents that contain none of
the query terms. Conceptually, we could store the inverted lists
in a PIR (Private Information Retrieval) [8] system. Since PIR
ensures that all retrievals are indistinguishable, the server can
discover neither which inverted list is retrieved, nor the identity
of the query term. However, PIR requires all the data to have
the same size, whereas the length of the inverted lists reﬂect
the occurrence count of the corresponding terms and vary
widely. With the Wall Street Journal corpus that we describe
later in the paper, for example, each inverted list holds only
186.7 pairs of 〈pij , dj〉 on average, but the longest list contains
127,848 pairs. To use a PIR, every inverted list must be padded
to the maximum length, increasing the total database size from
259 Mbytes to 178 Gbytes. Furthermore, as user queries differ
on the number of search terms, they must be padded to some
maximum number of terms so that every query invokes the
same number of PIR retrievals. Given that one PIR retrieval
can already be costlier than transferring the entire database
to the client [17], the approach is clearly impractical. Similar
arguments apply also to oblivious RAM [18].
Data Privacy through Encryption
Cryptographic techniques for an untrusted server to perform
keyword-matching over encrypted data, without knowing its
plaintext, have been proposed in [6], [19], [4], [3], [20]. While
they can be used to implement Boolean keyword-matching,
these techniques do not apply to the vector space model of
text retrieval [7] because the similarity score of a document
cannot be computed from its ciphertext.
Privacy-preserving retrieval has also been studied in the con-
text of databases. For example, [21], [22] and [23] described
how the tables and indices in a relational database can be
encrypted to still allow the execution of SQL queries. The
techniques can be adapted to perform keyword matching for
text documents, but again are not applicable to similarity-based
text retrieval.
Data Privacy through Hashing
In [24], Goh proposed a secure index scheme called Z-
IDX. A searcher with a trapdoor for some given word can
test its existence in the index in O(1) time. Trapdoors are
generated with a secret key, and are built on Bloom ﬁlters
[25] and pseudo random functions. Without the secret key and
legitimate trapdoors, an adversary can deduce no information
from the index. One of the stated applications for Z-IDX is in
keyword matching on encrypted documents.
[26] proposed to construct a privacy-preserving index (PPI)
on a set of documents from different providers. Each provider
summarizes the terms in its shared content through a bit
vector such as a Bloom ﬁlter [25]. At runtime, the index
server accepts a query and returns a shortlist of providers
that may contain matching documents. If the bit vector of a
provider gives a negative for the query terms, the provider
is guaranteed to hold no matching documents; otherwise,
there is a possibility that matching documents can be found
with the provider. The searcher then queries the shortlisted
providers directly to request matching documents. The primary
differences of PPI from our work are (a) PPI does not protect
the privacy of the user queries, (b) the PPI scheme targets
keyword matching, rather than similarity-based retrieval, and
(c) PPI affects the precision-recall of the original retrieval
mechanism.
Data Privacy through Anonymity
k-anonymity has been proposed as an alternative privacy
measure to encryption for statistical databases. A database is
k-anonymous if every record in it is indistinguishable from
at least k − 1 other records with respect to the accessible
attributes [27], [28]. The problem of k-anonymization is NP-
hard [29]. To tackle the computation complexity, [30] provided
approximation algorithms for generating k-anonymous tables,
while [31] developed a protocol for generating k-anonymous
tables in distributed environments. Machanavajjhala et al [32]
demonstrated that k-anonymity leaks information when the
sensitive attributes lack diversity; to counter that, an alternative
-Diversity measure was proposed. However, [33] showed that
an adversary can discover sensitive information with 100%
conﬁdence even in Machanavajjhala’s scheme.
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A common technique to protect user privacy in location-
based services is to artiﬁcially enlarge a user’s region of
interest to envelop k − 1 other users, so that the server is
not able to pinpoint the user who issues a given query [34].
The technique could be adapted for Boolean text search, by
padding a user query with spurious terms so that the server
is not able to identify the exact terms that characterize the
user’s intention. However, in the vector space model, such a
padded query would point to a different location in term space.
Without precise knowledge of the document distribution in
the term space, the user has no basis for deciding how many
more documents need to be retrieved without missing any
legitimate result documents for her genuine query. Therefore
this technique cannot be applied to the vector space model.
Data Privacy through Noise Injection
Another privacy technique for statistical databases is to intro-
duce noise to the data collection. By perturbing the data in a
controlled manner, it is possible to prevent accurate estimation
of individual observations while preserving certain statistical
properties (e.g. mean, covariance, variance) of the overall
database (e.g., [35], [36]). It is not clear how this technique
can be applied to a text corpus without affecting the similarity
scoring function though.
A number of related techniques have also been studied
in the context of structured data in the information systems
literature [37], [38], [39], [40]. However, the extension of these
techniques to our text corpus and text retrieval setting remains
an open question.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This paper studies the problem of obfuscating the user inten-
tion behind the text search queries in an enterprise application,
without necessitating a re-engineering of the search engine.
Figure 1 depicts the search process that we are working with.
Our search process differs from a conventional one (with no
privacy protection) in the addition of Steps 2 and 4, which
deal with ghost queries for obfuscating each user query. The
search engine model that is needed to support Steps 1 to 5
is described in Section III-A. Section III-B then discusses the
associated privacy threat; we also explain here why concerns
about possible privacy leak from retrieving result documents
(Steps 6 and 7) are excluded from the scope of this paper.
Table I summarizes the key notations, which will be explained
as they are used in the paper.
A. System Model
Our system model comprises two parties – a text search
engine, and many users. The search engine hosts a plaintext
corpus of δ documents D = {d1, d2, . . . , dδ}, composed from
a vocabulary of ω keywords or terms W = {w1, w2, . . . , wω},
and covering τ topics T = {t1, t2, . . . , tτ}. It may employ
any existing text retrieval mechanisms, like the classical vec-
tor space model [7], in conjunction with Web link analysis
techniques [41], [42]. Our work does not impose special
requirements or limitations on the search engine.
Notation Meaning
D Corpus containing δ text documents
W Vocabulary of ω keywords
qu User query; qu ⊂ W
qg Ghost query; qg ⊂ W
T Collection of τ topics
U User intention; U ⊆ T
Tm Topics selected for obfuscating U ; Tm ⊆ T
X Topics that are ineffective in obfuscating U ; X ⊆ T
Pr(t) Prior belief in topic t ∈ T
Pr(t|q) Relevance of topic t to query q
B(t|q) Boost in belief in topic t due to query q
1 Threshold for a topic to be deemed relevant
2 Threshold for a topic to be deemed exposed
C A cycle of 1 user query among υ − 1 ghost queries
TABLE I
KEY NOTATIONS
Each user submits plaintext queries through a trusted client
module. A user query qu targets certain topics in T , which
constitute the user intention U behind qu. The client module
generates obfuscating ghost queries, and submits them together
with qu to the search engine. The query results corresponding
to the ghost queries are discarded by the client, which returns
only the result for the genuine query. Thus, the ghost queries
are transparent to the user.
B. Threat Model
Our objective is to shield the user intention from the search
engine, which is a curious adversary. This means that the
adversary may analyze the search activity of the users after the
fact, rather than directly interfering with the query processing
(e.g., planting in the query result the summary of a document
selected by the adversary, to see whether the user is interested
enough to retrieve it). We focus on the threat posed by the
search engine because it is the most powerful potential adver-
sary in our model, as it hosts the plaintext corpus and index
structures, and it executes the query processing algorithms.
The knowledge of the adversary is not restricted to the search
engine though. In particular, the adversary may obtain a copy
of the ghost query implementation employed at the clients; he
may also submit chosen queries and observe their results.
The client module protects the user intention behind a query
by mixing it among ghost queries. The ghost queries must
appear to be realistic, and cannot be dismissed easily by an
adversary who is familiar with the ghost query generation
algorithm. In addition, the ghost queries should promote topics
that are outside of the user intention, while suppressing the
latter.
After inspecting the query result produced by the search
engine, the user may download selected result documents, the
content of which can potentially betray the user’s interest.
However, the threat can be countered with the commutative
encryption protocol in [15], which prevents the search engine
from identifying which documents are downloaded. Since a
ready solution exists, we exclude this threat from our study,
focusing instead on securing the user queries.
We also exclude tampering concerns posed by active adver-
saries, which have been addressed extensively in the context of
query result authentication, e.g., in [43]. Finally, our problem
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1. Formulate user query
2. Mix in ghost queries
3. For each query qi, generate result Ri
4. Filter ghost results
5. Examine query result 6. Examine document
qu Ru
q1, q2, .. qν R1, R2, .. Rν
7. Retrieve document
Document
ID
Document
Content
Search
Engine
Trusted
Client
Beyond Our Scope
Fig. 1. Search Process
is orthogonal to the protection of user identity, which may be
achieved through query log anonymization [44], or by letting
users connect to the search engine through an anonymous
network such as mix-net [45] or Tor [2].
IV. TOPPRIV: TOPICAL PRIVACY FRAMEWORK
Having deﬁned the system context and associated threats,
we now present our TopPriv framework for preserving the
privacy of search queries. We begin by laying out our topical
(1, 2)-privacy model, in which 1 and 2 are secret thresholds
set by individual users. Next, we explain how the topics
in a search query are modeled. The supporting topic model
may be constructed by the search engine if we are guarding
only against adversaries who analyze the query log after the
fact; otherwise, a trusted party could derive and certify the
topic model for distribution or, in the extreme case, the user
may run the topic modeling tool personally. Building on the
topic model, we then introduce our algorithm for generating
semantically coherent ghost queries to achieve (1, 2)-privacy
for text search queries. This is followed by an analysis of
TopPriv, and a comparison with existing privacy models.
A. Formulation of Privacy Model
The key notations for our privacy model are listed below:
• Let Pr(t) denote the prior belief in a topic t ∈ T . The
Pr(t) distribution corresponds to the topic coverage of
the corpus, and indicates the user’s general interest that
leads her to query the corpus.
• The posterior belief Pr(t|q) represents the relevance of
topic t to query q.
• The boost in belief in t due to q is B(t|q) = Pr(t|q) −
Pr(t).
The estimation of the various probabilities is explained shortly,
in Section IV-B.
Deﬁnition 1: At a given relevance threshold 1, a topic t ∈
T is relevant to a user query qu if B(t|qu) > 1; otherwise t
is irrelevant to qu.
Deﬁnition 2: The user intention U pertaining to a query qu
comprises the topics that are relevant to qu, i.e., U = {t|t ∈
T and B(t|qu) > 1} at a given relevance threshold 1.
To obfuscate U , the client submits υ− 1 ghost queries with
every user query. Thus, the search engine SE processes a
cycle of queries C = {q1, q2, . . . , qυ} each time. The ghost
queries must appear to be realistic, so that the adversary cannot
eliminate them through inspection. We advocate that a realistic
query should be semantically coherent.
Deﬁnition 3: A query is semantically coherent if its con-
stituent words describe common or related topics (or con-
cepts).
For example, the word ‘tank’ is semantically coherent with
‘abrams’ because both relate to weaponry, whereas ‘lemur’
and ‘sunspots’ are probably not semantically coherent.
Since the adversary cannot isolate the user query in a
cycle by eliminating ghost queries that are not semantically
coherent, he has to deduce the user intention through forming
his belief in each topic t ∈ T from the presence/absence of
keyword w ∈ W in/from the queries. Our approach is to cap
B(t|{q1, q2, . . . , qυ}), the extent that q1, q2, . . . , qυ collectively
boost SE’s belief in the relevant topics t ∈ U .
Deﬁnition 4: A search engine SE offers (1, 2)-privacy for
a query qu if its user intention U , measured at 1 relevance
threshold, is judged from the keyword composition of the
cycle of processed queries q1, q2, . . . , qυ to be irrelevant at
2 threshold. Speciﬁcally, ∀ t ∈ T , if B(t|q
u) > 1 then
B(t|{q1, q2, . . . , qυ}) ≤ 2.
Intuitively, a higher υ leads to a smaller exposure
B(t|{q1, q2, . . . , qυ}). By design, we allow individual users to
set the 1 and 2 thresholds needed for their tasks, and from
the thresholds adjust υ to meet the user requirement.
In our privacy model, the two thresholds should follow the
condition 1 ≥ 2 in order to shield the topics in U . Since
the boost in belief that they receive from q1, q2, . . . , qυ are
below the threshold 1 where topics are judged to be relevant,
this creates reasonable doubt in the adversary whether they
constitute the true intention. Another reason for the condition
is to prevent a situation where a user query qu with 1 <
B(t|qu) ≤ 2 ∀ t ∈ U could satisfy the model without any
protection, simply by using null phrases for the ghost queries.
B. Topical Modeling
As deﬁned above, our privacy model aims to protect the
user intention U , which is a subset of the topics T covered
by the underlying corpus. We assume that T includes several
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topics, say, at least a few dozens. This assumption is necessary
because, if the corpus covers only a handful of topics, the
mere act of querying such a homogeneous corpus already
conveys ample hint on the user intention. In practice, many
large corpora like news archives, digital libraries and the Web
indeed satisfy the assumption, so it does not unduly restrict the
applicability of our solution. For example, the Reuters News
Corpus1 utilizes around 125 topic codes.
For certain corpora, the topics T and document-topic as-
signments are known. For example, the articles in a conference
proceedings may be grouped into areas, which play the role
of topics. At the same time, many corpora like contract and
HR documents may not have explicit topics deﬁned. For
generality, in this work we do not assume the availability of
topic assignments. Rather, we employ a topic modeling tool,
called Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [46], to deduce the
latent topics in the corpus. (Appendix A discusses other topic
modeling tools.)
Given a corpus, we train an LDA model once and retain
it for subsequent query processing. The LDA model contains
two sets of conditional probabilities:
• Pr(w|t) ∀ w ∈ W and t ∈ T , which allow us to
determine the keywords w’s that best describe any topic
t; and
• Pr(t|d) ∀ t ∈ T and d ∈ D, which allow us to determine
the dominant topics t’s in any document d.
Assuming that every document in the corpus is equally useful,
Pr(d) = 1|D| for every d ∈ D. The prior belief Pr(t) in topic
t ∈ T is determined from the corpus as:
Pr(t) =
∑
d∈D
Pr(t|d)Pr(d) =
1
|D|
∑
d∈D
Pr(t|d) (1)
In addition, the trained LDA model can be used to infer
Pr(t|q), the relevance of any topic t to a set of queries {q}.
Thus, the user can determine the posterior belief Pr(t|qu) due
to her query qu, by passing qu alone to the LDA model in
inference mode. The user can also pass a cycle of queries
C = {q1, q2, . . . , qυ} to the LDA model to infer Pr(t|q)
for q ∈ C. Assuming that all the υ queries in the cycle
appear to be equally likely to the adversary, the posterior belief
Pr(t|{q1, q2, . . . , qυ}) in topic t ∈ T is:
Pr(t|{q1, q2, . . . , qυ}) =
∑
q∈{q1,q2,...,qυ}
Pr(t|q)Pr(q)
=
1
υ
∑
q∈{q1,q2,...,qυ}
Pr(t|q) (2)
In training an LDA model, we need to specify the number
of topics. We set this parameter to roughly the same magnitude
as the expected topic coverage of the corpus. The reason is
that if this parameter is set too low, each LDA topic becomes
a mixture of a few disparate corpus topics, so the LDA
topics are not useful for deducing the user intention behind a
query. While we do not expect all the topics derived by LDA
1http://trec.nist.gov/data/reuters/reuters.html
to correspond exactly to actual topics in the corpus, many
meaningful topics can be discovered as Table II in Appendix
A shows.
C. Topic-Cognizant Ghost Query Generation
Building on the above LDA model, we construct the follow-
ing algorithm for generating ghost queries to achieve (1, 2)-
privacy for user queries. Given a user query qu, the algorithm
returns C, a cycle of queries including qu and obfuscating
ghost queries. Each ghost query qg is populated with words
that are likely to describe a random masking topic, so that qg is
semantically coherent (by Deﬁnition 3) and appears realistic.
1) Given a user query qu, we use the LDA model to infer
the posterior probabilities Pr(t|qu) for each topic t ∈
T . Recall that we have previously obtained the prior
probabilities Pr(t). The topics t ∈ T with B(t|qu) =
Pr(t|qu) − Pr(t) > 1 constitute the user intention U
behind qu.
2) Initialization:
a) C = {qu}; the ghost queries generated will be
added to C progressively.
b) Tm = ∅; Tm ⊆ T \U holds the masking topics of
the ghost queries.
c) X = ∅; X ⊆ T \U\Tm holds the masking topics
attempted that are ineffective in obfuscating U .
3) Repeat until B(t|C) ≤ 2 for every t ∈ U :
a) Randomly set the length of the new ghost query qg
between some minimum and maximum multiples
of |qu|. (|q| is the number of search terms in query
q.)
b) Picking a masking topic tm ∈ T \U\Tm\X ran-
domly, we compose a topic vector
−→
t in which
Pr(tm) = 1 and Pr(t) = 0 ∀t = tm, then
compute the keyword probabilities with Pr(w) =∑
t∈T Pr(w|t)Pr(t). Randomly pick |q
g| words
to form the tentative ghost query qg , with a bias
for words w with higher probabilities Pr(w).
c) Inputting C ∪ {qg} to the LDA model, the in-
ferred topic probabilities give the posterior belief
Pr(t|C ∪ {qg}) and boost in belief B(t|C ∪ {qg}).
If maxt∈U B(t|C ∪ {q
g}) ≥ maxt∈U B(t|C), tm is
ineffective because qg increases the exposure of
U , so we set X = X ∪ {tm}; if X ⊂ T \U\Tm,
backtrack to Step 3(b) to try a different topic for
the ghost query, else exit the repeat loop.
d) Set Tm = Tm ∪ {tm} and C = C ∪ {q
g}.
4) Shufﬂe the queries in C and return it.
The above algorithm forms a ghost query qg by picking a
masking topic from T \U , then selecting keywords that are
descriptive of the masking topic (Step 3(b)). This produces
semantically coherent terms in qg , and gives the ghost query
a realistic composition. Following that, Step 3(c) ensures that
qg helps to lower the exposure of the user intention; this is
achievable because qg does not need to include any of the
genuine search terms in qu.
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In the course of generating the ghost queries, we loop
through Steps 3(b) to 3(d) at most |T \U| times, once for
each topic in T \U . Therefore the algorithm is guaranteed to
terminate. Upon termination, the ghost queries in C may or
may not succeed in keeping the exposure of the user intention
within 2; we will study the effectiveness of the ghost queries
empirically in Section V.
As a demonstration, consider query 91 among the TREC-1
and TREC-2 ad-hoc queries [12]. The query qu comprises the
search terms “u.s. army, abrams tank m-1, bradley ﬁghting
vehicle, apache helicopter ah-64, patriot missile, blackhawk
helicopter”, with the intention U to look for documents that
identify the U.S. army’s acquisition of advanced weapons sys-
tems. The query contains both high-speciﬁcity terms like ‘m-
1’, ‘ah-64’ as well as semantically-related terms like ‘apache’
and ‘helicopter’, making it difﬁcult to protect as explained
in [11]. Against the WSJ corpus, three of the ghost queries
produced by our algorithm with the LDA-200 model (to be
described in Section V-A) are:
• “dow index investors issues jones market rose shares
stock volume up”
• “apple computer computers corp ibm machines personal
software technology”
• “college education high professor public school schools
student students university”
which covers topics on ﬁnance, technology and education,
respectively. (Technology and education correspond to Topics
119 and 16 in the LDA200 model in Appendix A.) The words
in the user query and the ghost queries are sorted or shufﬂed
before they are submitted to the search engine. This does
not affect the query result because the search engine treats
each query as a bag of words [7], and helps us to avoid the
considerable complexity of formulating grammatically correct
ghost queries.
D. Resilience of TopPriv
If an adversary sees a cycle of queries C = {q1, q2, . . . , qυ},
what can he deduce about U , assuming that he possesses the
LDA model and ghost query generation algorithm? The attack
scenarios below show that there is no reliable way for the
adversary to recover U .
Discount a ghost query qg if its intention is exposed in C.
To determine the topics t ∈ T that are relevant to qg , the
adversary needs the value of 1. Moreover, 2 is needed to
decide whether any t is exposed in C. However, 1 and 2 are
secret thresholds set by individual users.
Discount high-exposure topics, i.e., those topics t ∈ T with
high B(t|C) levels. As LDA is a probabilistic model, most
if not all the topics t have positive Pr(t|C) values. In fact,
among the topics that satisfy B(t|C) ≤ 2, the topics in U
may not even rank highly as we observe in the experiments
in Section V. Without knowledge of 2, the adversary will not
know how many topics can be discounted safely.
Eliminate query words relating to high-exposure topics. If the
adversary attempts to eliminate from the queries in C those
terms w that have high Pr(w|t) for a topic t with high B(t|C)
level, he may in fact be removing genuine terms since the
same word could rank highly for different topics. To illustrate,
suppose that the user query qu is “apache helicopter”, and that
the topic on Web technologies has a high exposure whereas the
topic on U.S. weaponry is suppressed below 2. In discounting
the former topic, the adversary may remove the word ‘apache’,
which in fact is a genuine term in qu. The truncated query
qu\{apache} then leads to a U ′ that favors the topic on
aviation, different from the original U on U.S. weaponry.
Issue probing queries. The adversary may attempt to repeat the
ghost query generation performed by the user. In particular,
the adversary may in turn treat each query q in C as the user
query, and test whether our ghost query generation algorithm
produces the other queries in C\{q}. This attempt will not
succeed, because the masking topic and words of a ghost query
are picked randomly (in Step 3(b) of the algorithm).
E. Contrasts with Existing Privacy Models
Numerous privacy models have been proposed to protect
private information in various settings. Most of them are
designed for data publishing, where there exist a number
of users and a trusted curator. Each user has some sensitive
data that she is willing to share with the curator. The curator
collects data from the users, and releases a modiﬁed version
of the data to allow public study while safeguarding the
users’ privacy. In our text search context, in contrast, there
is no trusted entity to collect search queries from the users.
Thus, privacy models for data publishing are designed to suit
different requirements and are not applicable here.
Among the privacy models that are not restricted to data
publishing, k-anonymity [28], (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy [47], and dif-
ferential privacy [48] are the most related to text search. k-
anonymity, as mentioned in Section II, protects user queries
by mixing each subject among k − 1 decoys. It requires the
decoys to be as plausible as the protected subject, so that the
probability of the latter being identiﬁed is 1
k
. In our context,
such a requirement is unenforceable: Since the gain in belief
B(t|q) for a topic t is not controlled directly, but inﬂuenced by
the terms in q, it is not possible to ensure that there are k− 1
masking topics with identical gain in belief as an intended
topic. In contrast, our (1, 2)-model suppresses the genuine
query topics by pushing their gain in belief below 2.
(ρ1, ρ2)-privacy requires that if the adversary has ρ1 prior
belief in a certain property of a user query, then his posterior
belief after observing the modiﬁed query should be smaller
than ρ2. This deﬁnition is similar to our (1, 2)-privacy, in
the sense that they both constrain how the adversary’s belief
may change after observing the user input. Nevertheless, the
two privacy models formulate the adversary’s prior belief
in different manners: (1, 2)-privacy derives the prior belief
from the corpus of documents, whereas (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy makes
no assumption about the adversary’s prior knowledge. In
other words, (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy aims to guard against a stronger
adversary than (1, 2)-privacy does. This leads naturally to the
question: Why not just adopt (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy for text search?
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The answer is (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy may thwart the relevance scor-
ing mechanism of the search engine and degrade its usability.
Speciﬁcally, (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy requires each user’s data to
be modiﬁed with a randomized algorithm, so that the output
differs arbitrarily from the input [47]. If we apply (ρ1, ρ2)-
privacy, the revised query is not guaranteed to retain the
keywords in the original query. The results returned by the
search engine would then deviate from the user’s intention.
In contrast, as Section IV elaborates, (1, 2)-privacy can be
enforced in a manner that (i) allows users to obtain the exact
results of their queries, yet (ii) prevents the search engine from
learning the user intention. That is why (1, 2)-privacy is more
suitable for text search than (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy.
Similar to (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy, differential privacy obfuscates
the user query with a randomized algorithm. It requires that,
given any two different queries as the input, the distribution of
the algorithm’s output should be roughly the same. Intuitively,
this ensures that the algorithm’s output does not reveal much
information about the input and, hence, privacy is protected.
However, to fulﬁll the requirements of differential privacy, the
output of the randomized algorithm, with a certain probability,
would be entirely different from the input. This, as in the case
of (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy, prevents the search engine from returning
relevant results to the user, and renders differential privacy
inappropriate for text search.
V. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we empirically evaluate our TopPriv privacy
framework. The key questions to be investigated include: (a)
To what extent is TopPriv able to meet tight (1, 2)-privacy
requirements and obfuscate the user intention? (b) How does
the topical disclosure of TopPriv compare with the query
embellishment scheme of [11]? (c) How do the overheads of
TopPriv compare with the naive method of downloading the
inverted index to the client for query processing? We empha-
size that the scheme of [11] and the naive method both require
changes to the search engine, and cannot replace TopPriv
which works with existing search engines. The comparisons
are intended solely to proﬁle the privacy property of TopPriv.
A. Experiment Set-Up
Before investigating the above questions, we describe our
experiment set-up. The chosen dataset, search queries and
system resource conﬁguration correspond to what we expect
in an enterprise setting.
Dataset. We use the WSJ corpus, comprising 172,890 articles
published in the Wall Street Journal from December 1986
to March 1992. After removing stopwords (common words
like “the” and “a” that are not useful for differentiating
between documents) and words that appear only once, we
are left with 181,978 vocabulary terms. The removal of these
words is a standard step in document retrieval [7], and not
speciﬁc to our methods. Since our privacy framework entails
no changes to the search engine, a larger corpus does not alter
the qualitative behaviors that we observe, nor the conclusions
that we draw. The only difﬁculty that arises concerns the
computation time and memory needed to train the LDA model
on the entire corpus. We expect that this difﬁculty can be
overcome by training the LDA model on a representative
dataset, comprising documents sampled from the corpus and/or
only the more “impactful” words (e.g., as determined by TF-
IDF values [7]) in the vocabulary. As there are several possible
document sampling and word selection approaches, we leave
a systematic study of them for future work.
Workload. The workload includes 150 TREC-1 and TREC-
2 ad-hoc queries [12]. These search queries relate to clearly
deﬁned topics and contain 2 to 20 terms each. As such, they
pose a more realistic and challenging test of our privacy
framework than randomly composed queries and Web queries
(which are mostly short).
System Conﬁguration. The search engine runs on a Redhat
Linux box with eight Xeon 3.16 GHz CPUs and 16 GB of
main memory. The user machine is a notebook computer
with an Intel 1.33 GHz CPU and 2 GB of main memory,
running Ubuntu Linux. The client connects to the search
engine through a gigabit network switch.
Algorithm. Default settings for TopPriv are 1 = 5% and
2 = 1%. For topical modeling, we employ the Gibb-
sLDA++0.2 library from [49]. A key parameter of LDA is
the number of topics ntopics to derive from the corpus.
We generate LDA models with ntopics = 50, 100, 150,
200, 250 and 300, in order to investigate the impact of the
topical model on our solution. The models are denoted as
LDA050, LDA100, LDA150, LDA200, LDA250 and LDA300,
respectively. Among them, we use LDA200 as the default;
the various structures of LDA200, including its conditional
probabilities, add up to around 140 Mbytes. The Dirichlet
hyperparameters for the LDA models are left at the default
settings of α = 50/ntopics and β = 0.1.
Performance Metrics. The primary metrics include:
• Exposure, quantiﬁed by the largest boost in belief among
the topics in the user intention, i.e., max{B(t|C)|t ∈ U}.
The exposure measures how well our solution succeeds
in suppressing the user intention beneath the 2 threshold
as speciﬁed in the (1, 2)-privacy requirements.
• Mask level, deﬁned as the largest boost in belief among
the irrelevant topics, i.e., max{B(t|C)|t ∈ T \U}. The
mask level provides a yardstick for judging the visibility
of the user intention to the adversary – a low exposure
relative to mask level makes the user intention less
prominent, and vice versa.
• υ, the average cycle length or the number of queries in
a cycle. The υ − 1 ghost queries are responsible for the
overhead of privacy protection on the search engine.
• Query generation time, the duration taken by the client
device to execute our ghost query generation mechanism.
B. Suppression of User Intention
In the ﬁrst experiment, we ﬁx 1 at 5% while varying 2
from 0.5% up to 5%. The performance results are summarized
in Figure 2. Figure 2(a) shows that TopPriv manages to keep
8 
the exposure within 2, all the way down to around 2 = 3%.
At lower 2 settings, the exposure does not decline much more
even though the algorithm expends signiﬁcantly more effort
(in Figure 2(d)) in generating ghost queries (in Figure 2(c)).
Notwithstanding that, TopPriv succeeds in promoting irrele-
vant topics (as indicated by the mask levels in Figure 2(b)) to
dominate the relevant ones (as indicated by the exposure levels
in Figure 2(a)), hence effectively masking the user intention.
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Fig. 3. TopPriv with 1 = 2
Next, we equate the relevance thresholds 1 and 2. Com-
pared with the ﬁrst experiment, the results given in Figure 3
demonstrate a few interesting behaviors. First, our solution
is able to achieve lower exposures max{B(t|C) | t ∈ U} as
1 and 2 are lowered to 0.5%. The reason is that our ghost
query generation picks topics t ∈ T \U that by deﬁnition are
less than 1 relevant. By lowering 1 in tandem with 2, the
ghost query generation is forced to choose topics that are less
relevant to the user intention U . With 100 or more topics in
the LDA model, there are sufﬁcient topics that are less than
1 relevant to choose from, so our solution is able to achieve
lower B(t|C) for t ∈ U . In contrast, with LDA050, there are
too few topics remaining in T \U that can be used for the
ghost queries; this explains the upturn in B(t|C) as 1 and 2
drop below 2%, and also the slower growth in the cycle length
υ and query generation time.
Investigating deeper into the behavior of TopPriv, Fig-
ures 3(e) and 3(f) show the average number of relevant topics
|U|, and the highest rank (by B(t|C)) attained by any topic of
U . Evidently, the relevant topics are well-hidden behind many
irrelevant ones. For example, with LDA200 and 1 = 1%, the
3 relevant topics are dispersed among the bottom 188 topics;
in other words, each relevant topic is effectively overshadowed
by at least 12 irrelevant ones.
To summarize, the experiment results show that TopPriv
is effective in formulating ghost queries to obfuscate the
user intention in a search query. This is achieved through
substantially lowering the boost in belief in the relevant topics,
and by elevating the visibility of several irrelevant topics.
C. Comparing TopPriv with Prior Work
To benchmark the topical privacy protection of TopPriv,
we introduce as baseline the query embellishing algorithm
from [11], which provided better privacy protection than its
predecessors. The baseline is denoted as ‘PDX’, after the
initials of the authors. PDX obfuscates the user query by
embellishing it with decoy terms. The number of decoy terms
is controlled by a query expansion factor, the ratio of number
of terms in the embellished query to that in the original query.
To avoid distorting the query result, PDX requires a modiﬁed
search engine that computes document relevance through a
homomorphic encryption protocol.
To evaluate PDX in our context, we measure the topic
exposure max{B(t|qe)|t ∈ U} achieved by the embellished
query qe of PDX, using 1 as the threshold for topics that are
relevant to the user intention U . Figure 4 charts the results
obtained with various query expansion factors. For any ﬁxed
query expansion factor, the exposure of PDX tightens with an
increase in the number of topics in the LDA model. This is
because the posterior belief is spread across a larger number of
relevant topics in U . Another observation is that a larger query
expansion factor affords the PDX algorithm more leeway in
injecting suitable decoy terms to constrain the exposure.
Comparing TopPriv with PDX, Figure 5 plots the exposure
max{B(t|C)|t ∈ U} achieved by TopPriv with various cycle
lengths υ, divided by the exposure max{B(t|qe)|t ∈ U} of
PDX with query expansion factor equal to υ. In other words,
9 
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
15
20
Relevance Thresholds (%)
m
a
x
t i
∈
 U
 B
(t
i |
 q
e
) 
(%
)
(a) 2× Query Expansion
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
15
20
Relevance Thresholds (%)
m
a
x
t i
∈
 U
 B
(t
i |
 q
e
) 
(%
)
(b) 4× Query Expansion
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
15
20
Relevance Thresholds (%)
m
a
x
t i
∈
 U
 B
(t
i |
 q
e
) 
(%
)
(c) 8× Query Expansion
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
15
20
Relevance Thresholds (%)
m
a
x
t i
∈
 U
 B
(t
i |
 q
e
) 
(%
)
(d) 12× Query Expansion
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
15
20
Relevance Thresholds (%)
m
a
x
t i
∈
 U
 B
(t
i |
 q
e
) 
(%
)
(e) 16× Query Expansion
Fig. 4. Exposure achieved by the PDX Algorithm (following the legends in
Figure 3)
the total number of words in the queries in C is the same
as the number of words in PDX’s embellished query qe. The
results show that at υ = 2 for TopPriv and query expansion
factor of 2 for PDX, the ghost query introduced by TopPriv
are 30% more effective than the embellished query of PDX.
Moreover, the differential between the two algorithms widens
with higher υ and query expansion factors; for example, at
υ = 8, the exposure of TopPriv is merely 30% that of PDX.
The above comparison conﬁrms that TopPriv is more effec-
tive than PDX in protecting the user intention, especially with
tight (1, 2)-privacy requirements.
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D. Space Overhead of TopPriv
Besides query generation time, another overhead that Top-
Priv imposes on the client is the space allocation for the LDA
model. Our default LDA200 occupies roughly 140 Mbytes.
Admittedly, this is only a 45% saving, compared to the naive
approach of downloading the entire inverted index to the client
for query processing. However, as the number of documents
scales up, the inverted index grows roughly linearly, whereas
the vocabulary size gradually plateaus because the number of
meaningful terms is limited. Since the largest structure in the
LDA model is the matrix of conditional probabilities Pr(w|t),
its size levels off along with the vocabulary size, and its space
advantage over the naive approach widens correspondingly.
This is conﬁrmed in Figure 6, which plots the size of the
LDA200 model against the size of the inverted index as
we increase the number of documents. The sublinear growth
demonstrated by TopPriv enables it to scale much better to
large corpora than the naive approach. Another drawback
of the naive approach is it entails changes to the search
engine architecture, in pushing the determination of document
relevance to the clients.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we observe that a text search query may
betray what the user is interested in, not only by its term
composition, but also by the topic(s) underlying the query. To
shield the users and the enterprise from potential consequences
arising from their search activities, we propose a unique
approach to obfuscate the user intention behind the queries.
Our approach characterizes, for every topic covered by the
underlying corpus, its relevance to the user intention. We then
introduce a formal (1, 2)-privacy model which stipulates that
topics relevant to the user intention at 1 threshold should
appear to any adversary to be innocuous at 2 threshold, with
1 ≥ 2; this creates reasonable doubt in the adversary’s mind
whether those topics indeed constitute the true intention.
Based on the (1, 2) model, we present a TopPriv algorithm
for generating ghost queries that obfuscate the user intention.
Built upon the topical modeling technique of latent Dirichlet
allocation [46], TopPriv formulates realistic ghost queries from
semantically coherent terms that are taken from non-relevant
topics. As a consequence, the user intention becomes shad-
owed by irrelevant topics. Extensive experiments with a real
corpus and system conﬁgurations modeled after an enterprise
setting conﬁrm that TopPriv effectively obfuscates the user
intention in search queries. TopPriv also offers signiﬁcantly
better privacy and ease of deployment over existing schemes,
especially in meeting stringent (1, 2)-privacy requirements.
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APPENDIX A: TOPICAL MODELING
A.1 Illustration of LDA Models
Topic 14 Topic 114 Topic 119 Topic 16 Topic 46
aids chip computer school could
dr electronics ibm university would
cancer chips software students have
patients semiconductor computers education some
disease its machines schools may
study technology personal college say
blood dutch corp student might
test advanced apple high any
heart intel technology professor has
researchers philips its public likely
research instruments systems teachers more
tests industry digital who even
virus which new harvard out
who nv sun from much
testing guilders products class already
cells company microsoft educational still
human makers product many whether
medical market data parents one
people corp inc children take
treatment maker lotus have make
TABLE II
SAMPLE TOPICS IN THE LDA200 MODEL
LDA050 LDA100 LDA150 LDA250 LDA300
drug drug aids aids aids
health aids dr dr dr
medical drugs patients patients cancer
care dr cancer cancer patients
dr fda disease disease disease
aids patients research blood blood
patients research study test researchers
drugs cancer researchers heart study
research disease test researchers research
hospital blood blood study test
new heart heart tests heart
fda test who research tests
from use from virus virus
cancer researchers tests who who
disease from virus testing scientists
study treatment scientists cells university
doctors which drug human human
which study may may cells
treatment testing human treatment medical
heart tests testing scientists testing
TABLE III
A COMMON TOPIC ACROSS VARIOUS LDA MODELS
Our privacy protection mechanism in this paper is built upon
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [46]. To illustrate the topics
derived by LDA, Table II lists the top 20 words for some of
the topics in the LDA200 model. Many of the topics, such as
those in the ﬁrst four columns of the table, are quite speciﬁc
and coherent, while others like the one in the last column are
made up of generic words. Moreover, topics may be related
and even share common words; examples are Topics 114 and
119. We also observe that several distinct topics persist across
the various LDA models, albeit with minor variations in their
top-20 terms, as illustrated in Table III. Finally, Table IV
Topic 0 Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3 Topic 4
said from mr he million
million market he says said
company said would mr its
its year us his shares
year prices said have company
from billion have has stock
corp us has who bank
inc up from i inc
share stock government one new
sales new his more corp
mr trading who from securities
new were state some amp
president rose its new from
quarter than president we co
co dollar been about bonds
which have more out debt
business stocks court when about
unit rate which you group
has price federal than has
about some other all which
TABLE IV
TOPICS IN THE LDA005 MODEL
demonstrates that specifying too few topics causes LDA to
produce topics that are indistinct.
A.2 Alternative Topical Modeling Techniques
In this paper, we employ LDA to derive the topic model for
a given corpus. Besides LDA, techniques that are commonly
used for topical modeling include latent semantic analysis
(LSA) and probabilistic latent semantic analysis (pLSA). We
discuss the two techniques brieﬂy here.
• LSA [50] starts with the keyword-document matrix D
for the corpus. After decomposing D through singular
value decomposition (SVD), as D = U · Σ · VT , those
factors in the component matrices corresponding to small
Eigenvalues are discarded. The matrix U can be used to
map a document/query vector −→q to a topic vector
−→
t , as
−→
t = −→q ·U. Moreover, the keyword weights corresponding
to a topic vector can be derived as −→w = U ·
−→
t . The
main difﬁculty in using LSA for our purpose is that the
SVD procedure needs to materialize D, which consumes
too much memory for large corpora. For example, the WSJ
corpus for the experiments in this paper contains 172,890
documents, covering 181,978 keywords. The corresponding
D matrix alone would occupy 117 Gbytes of main memory,
which is way beyond the computational resources at our
disposal. Although studies like [51] have proposed to carry
out SVD on a sample of the corpus, doing so could
introduce signiﬁcant estimation errors.
• Given a training corpus, pLSA [52] derives the topic
probabilities Pr(t|d), term probabilities Pr(w|t), as well
as the topic probabilities Pr(t) for each document d, topic
t and term w. However, the generative semantics of pLSA
is not well deﬁned [46], meaning it is not clear how to
assign probability to a query encountered at runtime that
was not part of the training corpus. This difﬁculty deters
us from using pLSA in our work here.
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